Abstract-This paper studies the problem of detecting the information source in a network in which the spread of information follows the popular Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) model. We assume all nodes in the network are in the susceptible state initially, except one single information source that is in the infected state. Susceptible nodes may then be infected by infected nodes, and infected nodes may recover and will not be infected again after recovery. Given a snapshot of the network, from which we know the graph topology and all infected nodes but cannot distinguish susceptible nodes and recovered nodes, the problem is to find the information source based on the snapshot and the network topology. We develop a sample-path-based approach where the estimator of the information source is chosen to be the root node associated with the sample path that most likely leads to the observed snapshot. We prove for infinite-trees, the estimator is a node that minimizes the maximum distance to the infected nodes. A reverse-infection algorithm is proposed to find such an estimator in general graphs. We prove that for -regular trees such that , where is the node degree and is the infection probability, the estimator is within a constant distance from the actual source with a high probability, independent of the number of infected nodes and the time the snapshot is taken. Our simulation results show that for tree networks, the estimator produced by the reverse-infection algorithm is closer to the actual source than the one identified by the closeness centrality heuristic. We then further evaluate the performance of the reverse infection algorithm on several real-world networks.
In this paper, we are interested in the reverse of the diffusion problem: Given a snapshot of the diffusion process at time , can we tell which node is the source of the diffusion? The answer to this problem has many important applications, and can help us answer the following questions: Who is the rumor source in online social networks? Which computer is the first one infected by a computer virus? Who is the one who uploaded contraband materials to the Internet? Where is the source of an epidemic?
We call this problem information source detection problem. This information source detection problem has been studied in [3] - [5] under the Susceptible-Infected (SI) model, in which susceptible nodes may be infected but infected nodes cannot recover. The authors formulated the problem as a maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) problem and developed novel algorithms to detect the source.
In this paper, we adopt the Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) model, a standard model of epidemics [6] , [7] . The network is assumed to be an undirected graph, and each node in the network has three possible states: susceptible , infected , and recovered . Nodes in state can be infected and change to state , and nodes in state can recover and change to state . Recovered nodes cannot be infected again. We assume that initially all nodes are in the susceptible state except one infected node (called the information source). The information source then infects its neighbors, and the information starts to spread in the network. Now given a snapshot of the network, in which we can identify infected nodes and healthy (susceptible and recovered) nodes (we assume susceptible nodes and recovered nodes are indistinguishable), the question is which node is the information source.
We remark that it is very important to take recovery into consideration since recovery can happen due to various reasons in practice. For example, a contraband material uploader may delete the file, a computer may recover from a virus attack after anti-virus software removes the virus, and a user may delete the rumor from her/his blog. In order to solve the information source detection problem in these scenarios, we study the SIR model in this paper, which makes the problem significantly more challenging than that in the SI model as we will explain in Section I-B.
A. Main Results
The main results of this paper are summarized as follows.
• Similar to the SI model, the information source detection problem can be formalized as an MLE problem. Unfortunately, to solve the MLE problem, we need to consider all possible infection sample paths, and for each sample path, we need to specify the infection time and recovery time for each healthy node and the infection time for each infected node, so the number of possible sample paths is at the order of , where is the network size and is the time the snapshot is obtained. Therefore, the MLE problem is difficult to solve even when is known. The problem becomes much harder when is unknown, which is the assumption of this paper. To overcome this difficulty, we propose a sample-path-based approach. We propose to find the sample path that most likely leads to the observed snapshot and view the source associated with that sample path as the information source. We call this problem optimal sample path detection problem. We investigate the structure properties of the optimal sample path in trees. Defining the infection eccentricity of a node to be the maximum distance from the node to infected nodes, we prove that the source node of the optimal sample path is the node with the minimum infection eccentricity. Since a node with the minimum eccentricity in a graph is called the Jordan center, we call the nodes with the minimum infection eccentricity the Jordan infection centers. Therefore, the sample-path-based estimator is one of the Jordan infection centers.
• We propose a low-complexity algorithm, called reverse infection algorithm, to find the sample-path-based estimator in general graphs. In the algorithm, each infected node broadcasts its identity in the network, and the node who first collects all identities of infected nodes declares itself as the information source, breaking ties based on the sum of distances to infected nodes. The running time of this algorithm is equal to the minimum infection eccentricity, and the number of messages each node receives/sends at each iteration is bounded by the degree of the node.
• We analyze the performance of the reverse infection algorithm on -regular trees and show that the algorithm can output a node within a constant distance from the actual source with a high probability, independent of the number of infected nodes and the time the snapshot is taken.
• We conduct extensive simulations over various networks to verify the performance of the reverse infection algorithm. The detection rate over regular trees is found to be around 60% and is higher than that of the infection closeness centrality (or called distance centrality) heuristic. The infection closeness of a node is defined to be the inverse of the sum of distances to infected nodes and the infection closeness centrality heuristic is to claim the node with the maximum infection closeness as the source. Note that in [3] - [5] , the authors proved the node with the maximum infection closeness is the MLE on regular trees. We then further evaluate the performance of the reverse infection algorithm on several real-world networks.
B. Related Work
There have been extensive studies on the spread of epidemics in networks based on the SIR model (see [1] , [2] , [8] , [9] , and references within). The works most related to this paper are [3] - [5] , in which the information source detection problem was studied under the SI model. References [10] - [12] consider the problem of detecting multiple information sources under the SI model. The paper proposes an eigen-based algorithm for locating the sources, and a single path idea to determine the number of the sources. The single path used in [12] , however, is not a sample path of the SI process, so the approach is different from ours. This paper considers the SIR model, where infection nodes may recover, which can occur in many practical scenarios as we have explained. Because of node recovery, the information source detection problem under the SIR model differs significantly from that under the SI model. The differences are summarized as follows.
• The set of possible sources in the SI model [3] - [5] is restricted to the set of infected nodes. In the SIR model, all nodes are possible information sources because we assume susceptible nodes and recovered nodes are indistinguishable, and a healthy node may be a recovered node, so it can be the information source. Therefore, the number of candidate sources is much larger in the SIR model than that in the SI model. • A key observation in [3] - [5] is that on regular trees, all permitted permutations of infection sequences (a infection sequence specifies the order at which nodes are infected) are equally likely under the SI model. The number of possible permutations from a fixed root node, therefore, decides the likelihood of the root node being the source. However, under the SIR model, different infection sequences are associated with different probabilities, so counting the number of permutations is not sufficient.
• References [3] - [5] proved that the node with the maximum closeness centrality is the MLE on regular-trees. We define the infection closeness centrality to be the inverse of the sum of distances to infected nodes. Our simulations show that the sample-path-based estimator is closer to the actual source than the nodes with the maximum infection closeness. Other related works include: 1) detecting the first adopter of innovations based on a game theoretical model [13] in which the authors derived the MLE but the computational complexity is exponential in the number of nodes; 2) network forensics under the SI model [14] , where the goal is to distinguish an epidemic infection from a random infection; 3) geospatial abduction problems (see [15] , [16] , and references within).
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION

A. SIR Model for Information Propagation
Consider an undirected graph , where is the set of nodes and is the set of (undirected) edges. Each node has three possible states: susceptible , infected , and recovered . We assume a time-slotted system. Nodes change their states at the beginning of each time-slot, and the state of node in time-slot is denoted by Initially, all nodes are in state except node , which is in state and is the information source. At the beginning of each time-slot, each infected node infects each of its susceptible neighbors with probability , independent of other nodes, i.e., a susceptible node is infected with probability if it has infected neighbors. Each infected node recovers with probability , i.e., its state changes from to with probability . In addition, we assume a recovered node cannot be infected again. Since whether a node gets infected only depends on the states of its neighbors and whether a node becomes a recovered node only depends on its own state in the previous time-slot, the infection process can be modeled as a discrete-time Markov chain where is the states of all the nodes at time-slot . The initial state of this Markov chain is for and .
B. Information Source Detection
We assume is not fully observable since we cannot distinguish susceptible nodes and recovered ones. Hence, at time , we observe such that if is in state if is in state or . The information source detection problem is to identify given the graph and , where is an unknown parameter. Fig. 1 is an example of the infection process. The left figure shows the information propagation over time. The nodes on each dotted line are the nodes that are infected at that time-slot, and the arrows indicate where the infection comes from (e.g., node 4 is infected by node 2).
The figure on the right is the network we observe, where the shaded nodes are infected nodes and others are susceptible or recovered nodes. The pair of numbers next to each node are the corresponding infection time and recovery time. For example, node 3 was infected at time-slot 2 and recovered at time-slot 3.
indicates that the infection or recovery has yet occurred. Note that these two pieces of information are not available to us, and we include them in the figure to illustrate the infection and recovery processes. If we observe the network at the end of time-slot 3, then the snapshot of the network is , where the states are ordered according to the indices of the nodes.
C. Maximum Likelihood Detection
We define to be a sample path of the infection process from 0 to . We remark that "sample path" is a standard terminology in random processes and is defined to be a specific realization of a random process. In addition, we define function such that if otherwise. We say if for all . Identifying the information source can be formulated as a maximum likelihood detection problem as follows:
where is the probability to obtain sample path given the information source is node . , we need to decide the infection time, i.e., possible choices. Therefore, even for a fixed , the number of possible sample paths is at least at the order of , where is the number of nodes in the network. The exponential search space makes it computationally expensive, if not impossible, to solve the maximum likelihood problem. To overcome this difficulty, we propose a sample-path-based approach that is discussed in Section II-D.
D. Sample-Path-Based Detection
Instead of using the MLE, we propose to identify the sample path that most likely leads to , i.e.,
where The source node associated with is then viewed as the information source. We remark we assume only one single source in the network and the network topology is given. Furthermore, we assume all observations are accurate.
The notations used in the paper are summarized in Table I .
III. SAMPLE-PATH-BASED DETECTION ON TREE NETWORKS
The optimal sample paths for general graphs are still difficult to obtain. In this section, we focus on tree networks and derive structure properties of the optimal sample paths.
First, we introduce the definition of eccentricity in graph theory [17] . The eccentricity of a vertex is the maximum distance between and any other vertex in the graph. The Jordan centers of a graph are the nodes that have the minimum eccentricity. For example, in Fig. 2 , the eccentricity of node is 4, and the Jordan center is whose eccentricity is 3. Following a similar terminology, we define the infection eccentricity given as the maximum distance between and any infected nodes in the graph. Define the Jordan infection centers of a graph to be the nodes with the minimum infection eccentricity given In Fig. 2 , nodes , and are observed to be infected. The infection eccentricities of are , respectively, and the Jordan infection center is .
We will show that the source associated with the optimal sample path is a node with the minimum infection eccentricity. We derive this result using three steps: First, assuming the information source is , we analyze such that
i.e., is the time duration of the optimal sample path in which is the information source. It turns out that equals the infection eccentricity of node Considering Fig. 2 if the source is , then the time duration of the optimal sample path starting from is 2. In the second step, we consider two neighboring nodes, say nodes and We will prove that if , then the optimal sample path rooted at occurs with a higher probability than the optimal sample path rooted at .
Finally, at the third step, we will show that given any two nodes and , if has the minimum infection eccentricity and has a larger infection eccentricity, then there exists a path from to along which the infection eccentricity monotonically decreases, which implies that the source of the optimal sample path must be a Jordan infection center. For example, in Fig. 2 , node has a larger infection eccentricity than and is the path along which the infection eccentricity monotonically decreases from 5 to 2.
A. Optimal Time
Lemma 1: Consider a tree network rooted at and with infinitely many levels. Assume the information source is the root, and the observed infection topology is , which contains at least one infected node. If then the following inequality holds:
where . In addition where is the length of the shortest path between and and also called the distance between and , and is the set of infected nodes.
Intuition: A sample path with longer time duration involves more probabilistic events (infection, recover, etc.). For example, an infected node contributes a factor of in each time-slot to the overall probability to remain infected. Therefore, the sample path is likely to be associated with a smaller probability.
We prove Lemma 1 by using induction on the maximum distance between infected nodes and the source. When the maximum distance is zero, i.e., the source node is the only observed infected node, we will derive the closed-form expression of the probability of the optimal sample path with duration . We will see that the probability is a strictly decreasing function of , so is optimal in this case. We then assume the lemma holds for the case that the maximum distance is . When the maximum distance is , we apply the induction hypothesis on each of the subtrees, as shown in Fig. 3 in the paper, to prove the lemma. Specifically, given the optimal sample path with duration , on each subtree, we can construct a sub-sample path with one less time-slot but a higher probability. Combining all sub-sample paths, we get a sample path with duration , which occurs more likely than the optimal sample path with duration . The detailed proof of Lemma 1 is in Appendix A.
B. Sample-Path-Based Estimator
After deriving , we have a unique for each . The next lemma states that the optimal sample path starting from a node with a smaller infection eccentricity is more likely to occur. We denote by the tree rooted in , and by the tree rooted at but without the branch from For example, Fig. 3 shows , , , and , and Fig. 2 shows and . The sample path from time-slot 0 to restricted to is denoted by . Furthermore, denote by the set of children of . Lemma 2: Consider a tree network with infinitely many levels. Assume the information source is the root, and the observed infection topology is , which contains at least one infected node. For such that , if , then where is the optimal sample path starting from node . 
Intuition:
The key idea is to construct a sample path rooted at , which occurs with a higher probability than the optimal sample path rooted at . It is not difficult to see that based on the definition of the infection eccentricity. The network is partitioned into two subtrees and . The infection processes on these two subtrees are mutually independent after both and are infected. Based on this observation, given the optimal sample path rooted at (called SU), we construct a sample path rooted at (called SV) that has a higher probability. A pictorial example is shown in Fig. 4 . As shown on the left of Fig. 4 , SU has time-slots to form the observation in We will show that is infected at the first time-slot in SU. SV is shown on the right of Fig. 4 . In SV, is infected at the first time-slot. SU and SV on tree (light green part) has the same duration. We can choose SV to mimic SU on tree , hence having the same probability. However, SV has a duration of on (light blue part). Thus, we can find a SV with a higher probability than SU when restricted to tree based on Lemma 1. As a summary, SV has a higher probability than SU. The detailed proof of Lemma 2 is presented in Appendix B.
Next, we give a useful property of the Jordan infection centers in the following lemma.
Lemma 3: On a tree network with at least one infected node, there exist at most two Jordan infection centers. When the network has two Jordan infection centers, the two must be neighbors.
Intuition: If two Jordan infection centers are not adjacent, we pick the node that is on the shortest path between two Jordan centers and is adjacent to one Jordan infection center. We show that this node has a smaller infection eccentricity, which is a contradiction. If any two Jordan infection centers are adjacent, more than two Jordan infection centers will form a clique, which is impossible on a tree. Therefore, we have at most two Jordan infection centers, and they are adjacent. The detailed proof of Lemma 3 is presented in Appendix C.
Based on Lemmas 2 and 3, we finish this section with the following theorem.
Theorem 4: Consider a tree network with infinitely many levels. Assume that the observed infection topology contains at least one infected node. Then, the source node associated with [the solution to the optimization problem (1) , where is the set of nodes who receive distinct IDs when the algorithm terminates. Ties are broken at random.
The key of this proof is to show that along the path from any node to a Jordan infection center, the infection eccentricity strictly decreases by repeatedly using Lemma 2. The detailed proof of Lemma 4 is presented in Appendix D.
IV. REVERSE INFECTION ALGORITHM
Since in tree networks with infinitely many levels, the estimator based on the sample path approach is a Jordan infection center, we view the Jordan infection centers as possible candidates of the information source. We next present a simple algorithm to find the information source in general networks. The algorithm is to first identify the Jordan infection centers, and then break ties based on the sum of distances to infected nodes.
The key idea of the algorithm is to let every infected node broadcast a message containing its identity (ID) to its neighbors. Each node, after receiving messages from its neighbors, checks whether the ID in the message has been received. If not, the node records the ID (say ), the time at which the message is received (say ), and then broadcasts the ID to its neighbors. When a node receives the IDs of all infected nodes, it claims itself as the information source, and the algorithm terminates. If there are multiple nodes receiving all IDs at the same time, the tie is broken by selecting the node with the smallest
The tie-breaking rule we proposed is to choose the node with the maximum infection closeness [18] . The closeness measures the efficiency of a node to spread information to all other nodes. The closeness of a node is the inverse of the sum of distances from the node to any other nodes. In our model, we define the infection closeness as the inverse of the sum of distances from a node to all infected nodes, which reflects the efficiency to spread information to infected nodes. We select a Jordan infection center with the largest infection closeness, breaking ties at random.
It is easy to verify that the set is the set of the Jordan infection centers. The running time of the algorithm is equal to the minimum infection eccentricity, and the number of messages each node receives/sends during each time-slot is bounded by its degree. To implement the RI algorithm, each node maintains an array of integers of size and an integer counter. We assign an integer index to each infected node. The values of that integer array are the distances from the node to the infected nodes. The integer counter records the number of distinct indexes received. A message only contains the index of an infected node. At each iteration, each node broadcasts the new indexes to its neighbors. When a node receives a new message, it checks the specific index to see whether the index has been received. If not, it updates the value at the corresponding location of the array with the current iteration number, which equals to the distance from the current node to the infected node with the received index. Otherwise, the message is discarded. Then, the node increases the value of its integer counter by one and checks whether the value is . All operations mentioned above have constant complexity. Therefore, the complexity of processing one message is . Each edge is used to transmit at most messages in one direction. Hence, there are at most messages to be handled. Therefore, the worse-case complexity of our RI algorithm is . We remark that we did not call the algorithm a "message-passing" algorithm to avoid the confusion with statistical inference algorithms for solving sum product or max product problems in graphical models.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
The reverse infection algorithm is based on the structure properties of the optimal sample paths on trees. While the MLE is the node that maximizes the likelihood of the snapshot among all possible nodes, the sample-path-based estimator does not have such a guarantee. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the sample-path-based approach, we next show that on -regular trees where each node has neighbors, the information source generated by the reverse infection algorithm is within a constant distance from the actual source with a high probability, independent of the number of infected nodes and the time at which the snapshot was taken.
Theorem 5: Consider a -regular tree with infinitely many levels where and . Assume that the observed infection topology contains at least one infected node. Given , there exists such that the distance between the optimal sample path estimator and the actual source is with probability , where is independent of the number of infected nodes and the time the snapshot was taken.
Intuition: In the proof, we will show with a high probability one of the following events will occur: 1) the infection process terminates within hops from the source; 2) at least nodes are infected in the -hop neighborhood of the source. When the first event occurs, it is easy to see that the detected source is a constant distance from the actual source. When the second event occurs, we will study the infection processes starting from the infected nodes that are within hops away from the source. For each node, we consider a branching process in which a node's offsprings are the nodes that are immediately infected after the node is infected. Hence, the branching process grows one level at each time-slot. We will show that with a high probability two branching processes starting from the nodes within hops from the source survive. This guarantees that we will have at least two observed infected nodes who are apart from each other, which guarantees that the minimum infection eccentricity of the network is . Since the infection eccentricity of the source node is at most , we can then conclude that the detected source, which has an infection eccentricity is not far from the actual source by using the fact the path between two nodes is unique on a tree. The detailed proof of Theorem 5 is presented in Appendix E.
VI. SIMULATIONS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the reverse infection algorithm on different networks, including different tree networks and some real-world networks.
A. Tree Networks
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the reverse infection algorithm on tree networks. We compare the reverse infection algorithm with the closeness centrality heuristic, which selects the node with the maximum infection closeness as the information source. Note that the node with the maximum closeness is the maximum likelihood estimator of the information source on regular trees under the continuous-time SI model [3] - [5] . For each simulation setting, we repeated the simulation 1500 times to get the average detection rates.
1) Small-Size Tree Networks:
We first studied the performance on small-size trees. The infection probability was chosen uniformly from , and the recovery probability was chosen uniformly from . The infection process propagates time-slots, where was uniformly chosen from . To keep the size of infection topology small, we restricted the total number of infected and recovered nodes to be no more than 100. For small-size trees, we first calculated the MLE using dynamic programming for fixed and then searching over for a large value of to find the optimal estimator.
The detection rate is defined to be the fraction of experiments in which the estimator coincides with the actual source. We varied from 2 to 10, and the results are shown in Fig. 5 . We can see that the detection rate of the reverse infection algorithm is almost the same as that of the MLE, and is higher than that of the closeness centrality heuristic by approximately 20% when the degree is small and by 10% when the degree is large.
2) General -Regular Tree Networks: We further conducted our simulations on large-size -regular trees. The infection probability was chosen uniformly from , and the recovery probability was chosen uniformly from . The infection process propagates time-slots where was uniformly chosen from . We selected the networks in which the total number of infected and recovered nodes is no more than 500.
We varied from 2 to 10. Fig. 6 shows the detection rate as a function of . We can see the detection rates of both the reverse infection and closeness centrality algorithms increase as the degree increases and is higher than 60% when However, the detection rate of the reverse infection algorithm is higher than that of the closeness centrality algorithm, and the average difference is 8.86%.
3) Binomial Random Trees: In addition, we evaluated the performance on binomial random trees where the number of children of each node follows a binomial distribution with number of trials and success probability . We fixed and varied from 0.1 to 0.9. The durations of the infection process and the observed infected networks were selected according to the same rules for the -regular tree case. The results are shown in Fig. 7 . Similar to the regular tree case, as increases, the tree is denser, which increases the number of survived branching processes and the detection rate. The reverse infection algorithm outperforms the closeness centrality algorithm by 10.16% on average.
B. Real-World Networks
We next conducted experiments on three real-world networks-the Internet Autonomous Systems network (IAS), 1 the Wikipedia who-votes-on-whom network (Wikipedia), 1 power grid network (PG). 2 We compare the reverse infection algorithm to the CC algorithm and random guessing that randomly selects a node and declares it as the information source. In the comparison to CC, we only included those experiments in which the two algorithms produced different estimators. In these networks, the infection probability was chosen uniformly from , and the recovery probability was chosen uniformly from . Here, we chose small infection probabilities since the network was of finite size, so the infection process should be controlled to make sure that not all nodes were infected when the network was observed. The duration was an integer uniformly chosen from . We selected the networks in which the total number of infected and recovered nodes was in the range of . For each setting, we repeated the simulation 5000 times to compute the histograms. Fig. 8 shows the results on the Internet Autonomous Systems network. An Internet autonomous system is a collection of connected routers who use a common routing policy. The Internet Autonomous Systems network is obtained based on the recorded communication between the Internet autonomous systems inferred from Oregon route-views on March 31, 2001. The network consists of 10 670 nodes and 22 002 edges. According to Fig. 8(a) , more than 80% of the estimators identified by the reverse infection algorithm are no more than two hops away from the actual sources, compared to 10% under the random guessing. From  Fig. 8(b) , we can see that while the reverse infection algorithm has a slightly lower frequency at 1-hop distance (21.9% versus 27.2%), it has a much higher frequency at 2-hop distance (57.4% versus 28.7%). Fig. 9 shows results on the Wikipedia who-votes-on-whom network, in which two nodes are connected if one user voted on the other in the administrator promotion elections. The network has 100 736 links and 7066 nodes. We have similar observations as for the Internet Autonomous Systems network: The majority of the estimators produced by the reverse infection algorithm are no more than two hops away from the actual sources; only less than 20% of the estimators of random guessing are within two hops from the actual sources as shown in Fig. 9(a) . The closeness centrality has a slightly higher frequency at 1-hop distance, but much lower frequency at 2-hop distance as shown in Fig. 9(b) .
1) Internet Autonomous Systems Network:
2) Wikipedia Who-Votes-on-Whom Network:
3) Power Grid Network: Fig. 10(a) shows the results on the power grid, which has 4941 nodes and 6594 edges. As we can see, the reverse infection algorithm performs better than the random guessing. The peak of the reverse infection algorithm appears at the third hop versus the 17th hop under random guessing as shown in Fig. 10(a) . The reverse infection algorithm has a higher frequency than the closeness centrality algorithm when the hop distance is no more than 4 on the power network in Fig. 10(b) .
C. Impact of Recovered Nodes
So far, we have assumed that susceptible nodes and recovered nodes are indistinguishable. In certain scenarios, the set of recovered nodes may be identified as well. The questions, therefore, are the following: Can the information about the recovered nodes improve the performance of the algorithms, and how does RI compare to CC when the recovered nodes are known? To answer these two questions, we conducted the experiments on the binomial random trees and the power grid network. The simulation settings are the same as those in the previous sections. When the recovered nodes are identified, the Jordan infection centers are defined with respect to all infected and recovered nodes. Similarly, in CC, the infection closeness is also defined with respected to all infected and recovered nodes.
The results are shown in Fig. 11 . In Fig. 11(a) , we can see that the average distance from the estimator to the actual source reduces when the recovered nodes are known and used as infected TABLE II  ADDITIONAL NOTATION TABLE   nodes . Hence, the information about recovered nodes does help. In addition, RI is better than CC. For the power grid network, we again observe that the information of infected nodes improves the performance. However, RI and CC have similar performance when the recovered nodes are known.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we developed a sample-path-based approach to find the information source under the SIR model. We proved that the sample-path-based estimator is a node with the minimum infection eccentricity. Based on that, a reverse infection algorithm has been proposed. We analyzed the performance of the reverse infection algorithm on regular trees and showed that with high probability the distance between the estimator and actual source is a constant, independent of the number of infected nodes and the time the network was observed. We evaluated the performance of the proposed reverse infection algorithm on several different network topologies.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF LEMMA 1 Table II summarizes extra notations used in the proof.
Proof: We start from the case where the time difference of two sample paths is one, i.e., we will show that (2) We divide all possible infection topologies into countable subsets , where is the set of infection topologies where the largest distance from to an infected node is . is the topology where there is only one infected node-the root node . Note that if no infected node is observed, no algorithm performs better than a random guess. To prove (2), we use induction over .
Step 1: First, we consider the case . All the sample paths considered in Step 1 lead to observation . We have where the last equality holds since is the only infected node in the network at time , which requires for . Node has two possible states or .
Step 1.a: is susceptible if it was not infected within timeslots. In each time-slot, tries to infect with probability . The probability that is susceptible at time-slot is which implies that (3) if .
Step 1.b: If is in the recovered state, we denote by and its infection and recovery times, respectively. Then, we have if where is the probability that node was infected at time and recovered at time . Since is also an infinite tree, there exists at least one node such that the node is in the susceptible state but its parent node (say node ) is in the recovered state. We denote by the set of nodes that are on subtree but not on subtree . Then (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) where (7) holds because remained to be susceptible during the time-slots at which was in the infected state and (8) holds because . The maximum value of can be achieved in the sample path in which was infected and then recovered in the next time-slot so that was vulnerable to infection only in one time-slot. Furthermore is maximized when , , i.e., was infected at the first time-slot and recovered in the second time-slot. Therefore, if (9) Step 1.c: Define to be the optimal solution to For , we have
For , since all are in the susceptible state
For , according to (3) and (9) (12)
Note that is fixed in this optimization problem and (13) is a nonincreasing function of . Since
In summary, is a nonincreasing function of when .
Step 2: Assume (2) holds for , and consider . Clearly, for each such that
Furthermore, the set of subtrees is divided into two subsets: and , where is the vector of restricted to subtree . In Fig. 3 , and . We note that given , the infection processes on the subtrees are mutually independent.
Step 2.a: Recall that is the set of subtrees having no infected nodes. Following the argument for the case, we can obtain that if , then when and when . So is nonincreasing in given any .
Step 2.b: For , given the sample path , we will construct a sample path that occurs with a higher probability. Denote the infection time of in sample path by . We let denote the infection time in sample path . If , we choose , i.e., is infected one timeslot later in than that in . Assume the infection processes after was infected are the same in the two sample paths and . Therefore, we have and where is the probability of after was infected. Since the sample paths and are the same after was infected, we obtain Therefore, with , we get If , we set . 3 Based on the induction assumption, for since , we have where : . Therefore, given any , we can always find a corresponding sample path , which occurs with a higher probability.
Step by having optimal ones on and constructing the ones in following Step 2.b. According to Steps 2.a and 2.b, it is easy to verify that occurs with a higher probability than . Therefore, we conclude that inequality (2) holds for , hence for any according to the principle of induction.
Step 3: Repeatedly applying inequality (2), we obtain that is the minimum amount of time required to produce the observed infection topology. The minimum time required is equal to the maximum distance from to an infected node. Therefore, the lemma holds. If , all infected nodes are in , so it is obvious .
Step 2: In this step, we will prove that on the sample path . If on , then
Note that according to the definition of and , within time-slots, node can infect all infected nodes on . Since , the infected node farthest from node must be on , which implies that there exists a node such that and . Hence, node cannot reach within time-slots, which contradicts the fact that the infection can spread from node to within time-slots along the sample path . Therefore, .
Step 3: Now given sample path , we construct , which occurs with a higher probability. We divide the sample path into two parts along subtrees and . Since , we have where is the probability that is infected at the first time-slot. Suppose in , node was infected at the first time-slot, then For the subtree , given , in which , we construct the partial sample path to be identical to except that all events occur one time-slot earlier, i.e., This is feasible because . Then
For the subtree , we construct such that
Based on Lemma 1, we have Therefore, given the optimal sample path rooted at , we have constructed a sample path rooted at which occurs with a higher probability. The lemma holds. In a summary, which contradicts the fact that the minimum infection eccentricity is . Therefore, all Jordan infection centers must be adjacent to each other. However, suppose there exist infection eccentricity centers where , they would form a clique with nodes, which contradicts the fact that the graph is a tree. Therefore, there exist at most two adjacent Jordan infection centers.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Proof: We assume the network has two Jordan infection centers: and , and assume . The same argument works for the case where the network has only one Jordan infection center.
Based on Lemma 3, and must be adjacent. We will show for any , there exists a path from to (or ) along which the infection eccentricity strictly decreases.
Step 1: First, it is easy to see from Fig. 12 that . We next show that there exists a node such that the equality holds.
Suppose that for any , which implies Since and are both Jordan infection centers, we have In a summary, This contradicts the fact that . Therefore, there exists such that
Step 2: Similarly, and there exists a node such that the equality holds.
Step 3: Next, we consider , and assume and . Then, for any , we have and there exists such that the equality holds. On the other hand, Therefore, we conclude that so the infection eccentricity decreases along the path from to .
Step 4: Repeatedly applying Lemma 2 along the path from node to , we can conclude that the optimal sample path rooted at node is more likely to occur than the optimal sample path rooted at node . Therefore, the root node associated with the optimal sample path must be a Jordan infection center, and the theorem holds.
APPENDIX E PROOF OF THEOREM 5
Proof: Consider the tree rooted at the information source . We say is at level 0. We denote by the set of infected and recovered nodes at level . Furthermore, we define to be the set of infected and recovered nodes at level whose parents are in set and who were infected within time-slots after their parents were infected. We assume . In addition, let and . Note and given and i.e., the infection times of nodes in differ by at most (note that the difference is not since the parents of and may be infected at different times). Our proof is based on the Galton Watson (GW) branching process [19] . A GW branching process is a stochastic process that evolves according to the recurrence formula and where is a set of random variables, taking values from nonnegative integers. The distribution of is called the offspring distribution of the branching process. In a -regular tree, the evolution of is a branching process, where the offspring distribution is a function of . We use to denote the corresponding branching process, and to denote the number of offsprings at level , i.e., (we use these two notations interchangeably).
Each infected node can be viewed as the source of branching processes on the subtree rooted at the node. We define to be the number of survived branching processes whose roots are in set , where a branching process survives if it never dies out. Now given , we consider the following events: • Event 1: ; • Event 2:
. It is equivalent to for some . In other words, at least two branching processes starting from survive for some . We note that these two are disjoint events. When , no node at level is infected, and the infection process terminates at level . When there is at least one infected node in , since , the minimum infection eccentricity is at most . Therefore, the distance between and is no more than . Given for some , we will argue that the distance between the sample-path-based estimator and the actual one is upper-bounded by . Consider Fig. 13 , where the shaded nodes are infected and recovered nodes. We will show that if two branching processes starting from survive, a node at level cannot be a Jordan infection center. Recall that at time , the distance between any infected node and the actual source is no more than , which implies the eccentricity of a Jordan infection center is . Now consider a node at level . Recall that at least two branching processes starting from level survive. Let be the root of a survived branching process, and assume node is not on the subtree rooted at . Furthermore, assume is an infected node at the lowest level on subtree . Since the branching process survives, the infection process propagates one level lower at each time-slot, and node is at level . From Fig. 13 , it is easy to see that the distance between and is at least which occurs when the first common predecessor of nodes and is at level. Note that the common predecessor cannot appear at level since is not on . Since , the infection time of node is no later than , i.e., . Therefore, the distance between and is at least , which is larger than . Hence, cannot be a Jordan infection center. Since , any node at or below level cannot be a Jordan infection center. In a summary, if event 2 occurs, then we have
We next show that given any , we can find sufficiently large and , independent of and the number of infected nodes, such that the probability that either event 1 or event 2 occurs is at least . Given and , we define i.e., is the first level at which has more than nodes. We first have for some and Note that we have (14) According to Lemma 6 Note that is a positive constant since the branching process starting from the information source survives with nonzero probability. The theorem holds by choosing .
